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in Property Insurance Coverage
A difficult problem is presented in determining whether a
property insurance policy covers a loss caused by interaction
of insured and uninsured risks. Some courts have resolved
the question by an application of a "proximate cause" test;
others have applied a "contemplated damages" test. The
author of this Note describes and analyzes these two ap-
proaches in three distinct casual relationships, and con-
cludes that the "proximate cause" test is the more satisfac-
tory since it provides a greater degree of predictability of
policy coverage.
Three automobile owners, A, B, and C, have policies insuring
against losses by fire but collision damage is excepted. A's automo-
bile is damaged when a fire breaks out in the car, panicking A and
causing a collision. B's automobile is damaged when a collision
causes a fire; and C's automobile is damaged when a collision and a
fire occur simultaneously from independent causes. In determining
whether A, B, and C recover their losses on their policies, a funda-
mental question arises as to what test should be used to determine
the coverage of any property insurance policy.
Although courts have not been consistent in their treatment of
these problems of policy coverage, generally two approaches have
been taken to determine whether the insurance policies cover each
of these losses. Some courts apply a proximate cause concept analo-
gous to that applied in tort cases 1 and hold the insurer liable for all
1. The term "proximate cause" has been given a variety of meanings. See PRossm,
TORTS § 48 (2d ed. 1955). For purposes of the following discussion, the term is
referred to in the "direct causation" sense, where responsibility is attached to an
event if the loss followed reasonably therefrom, and if no self-sufficient and control-
ling force intervened. See, e.g., Dixie Pine Prod. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 133 F.2d
583 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 743 (1943). Cf. REsTATEmENT, TORTS §
435 (1934). In some jurisdictions, the loss must be foreseeable to be proximately
caused by a given event. See, e.g., Milwaukee & St. P. R.R. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469(1876); Shideler v. Halinger, 172 Kan. 718, 243 P.2d 211 (1952); Mauney v. Gulf
Ref. Co., 193 Miss. 421, 9 So. 2d 780 (1942). Where the foreseeable loss rule is
applied, there would probably be no difference between the tort proximate cause test
and the contract rule of damages, for each requires the injury to be reasonably within
the mind of the party to be held responsible before liability will attach.
In Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Moore, 206 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), the
court stated that the proximate cause concept as applied to insurance cases has a
meaning substantially similar to that applied in negligence cases, except the element
of foreseeability is lacking. This approach would be essentially the same as an
application of the "direct causation" theory of proximate cause.
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losses proximately caused by an insured event.' Other courts apply
the technique used to measure damages in contract cases 3 and hold
the insurer liable for losses reasonably within the contemplation of
the parties at the time of policy execution.' Whether A, B, and C
would recover in the three situations set out above may depend
upon which of these two tests is applied. This Note will analyze the
two tests to determine which is best suited to define property insur-
ance 5 coverage in the three situations illustrated above: (1) where
an insured event causes an excepted loss, (2) where an excepted
event causes an insured loss, and (3) where an insured and an ex-
cepted event join to produce a loss which neither would have pro-
duced alone.
I. INSURED EvENT CAUSING AN ExcEpr'r Loss
The risk assumed by an insurer of property is almost always sub-
ject to two kinds of limiting provisions. One limits the coverage by
excepting losses caused by particular events,' while the other limits
the coverage of the consequences of the insured event.
A. Proximate Cause Test
The leading case in which the proximate cause test was applied is
Lynn Gas & Elec. Co. v. Meriden Ins. Co.8 There a fire caused a short
circuit in an electrical system which resulted in damage to the in-
sured's machinery. When the insured sued for recovery on his fire
insurance policy, the court compared the application of the proxi-
mate cause rule in insurance cases to its application in other actions
and stated: "the question, What is a cause which creates liability? is
to be determined in the same way in actions on policies of fire insur-
2. See, e.g., Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y v. Board of Comm'n, 141 F.2d 600
(5th Cir. 1944); Lynn Gas & Elec. Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 33
N.E. 690 (1893); Friedman v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 4 Wis. 2d 641, 91
N.W.2d 328 (1958).
3. See Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 245 N.Y. 284, 157 N.E. 140, cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 557 (1927); Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341 (1854). For a further
discussion of the applicable contract law see REs-ATEMENT, CoNTrscrs § 330
(1932); 5 ConNn, CoNTaAcrs § 1007 (1951); 5 WILLasTON, CoNTRActs § 1344 (rev.
ed. 1937).
4. See, e.g., National Fire Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield, 160 Ky. 802, 170 S.W. 187
(1914); Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918);
Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Sikes, 197 Okla. 137, 168 P.2d 1016 (1946).
5. Because the field of insurance includes so many different types of indemnifica-
tion, the scope of this Note is necessarily limited to property insurance. However, itis robable that the analysis is applicable to other fields of insurance, such as liability
N life insurance.
6. See note 33 infra and acompanying text.
7. For example, a fire insurance policy does not cover loss of profits due to destruc-
tion of the insured property unless specifically provided for. For a discussion of risk
controls in insurance contracts, see PATrERSoN, EssEmTLALs OF INsuRAwcE LAW §§
57-59 (2d ed. 1957).
8. 158 Mass. 570, 33 N.E. 690 (1893).
ance as in other actions." 9 The court then applied the proximate
cause test and allowed recovery.
The Lynn case did not involve a situation where an insured event
caused an excepted loss. However, most courts apply the proximate
cause test when an insured event causes an excepted loss and allow
recovery on the ground that the predominant and efficient cause of
the loss was insured against.10 It would seem that to grant recovery
for an excepted loss is contrary to the terms of the policy, but courts
have used a variety of theories to reconcile recovery with the policy
terms. A number of courts have dismissed the excepted loss as in-
cidental." For example, in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Sikes 2 a
windstorm, an insured event, blew plaintiff's house into a flooded
street causing flood damage, an excepted loss. The court allowed re-
covery for the full amount of the loss on the ground that the flood
damage was only incidental to the total loss.
When the excepted loss contributes only slightly to the total loss,
as in the Sikes case, it is proper for the courts to regard the excepted
loss as incidental. But when the insured event itself inflicts no dam-
age, and the only damage incurred is of the nature expressly ex-
cepted from the policy, the court is not justified in regarding the
loss as incidental. To illustrate, in Cole v. United States Fire Ins.
Co.'3 the plaintiff's policy insured against fire damage but excepted
loss by explosion. The court granted recovery for explosion damage
caused by an arsonist throwing a lighted match into a room he had
earlier saturated with gasoline. The court characterized the loss by
explosion as only incidental to the total loss. But clearly, since the
explosion damage is the only damage, it cannot properly be dismis-
sed as incidental; to so characterize it adds no support to the result.'4
Another device used by courts to grant recovery for a loss ex-
9. Id. at 576, 33 N.E. at 692.
10. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fire Ins. Co. v. Dorsey, 56 Md. 70 (1880) (insured
fire caused excepted explosion); Shirey v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 274 P.2d 386 (Okla.
1954) (insured windstorm caused excepted upset); Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Weather-
man, 193 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (insured windstorm caused excepted
collision); Friedman v. Insurance Co. of No. America, 4 Wis. 2d 641, 91 N.W.2d
328 (1958) (insured windstorm caused excepted upset). But see Delametter v. Home
Ins. Co., 233 Mo. App. 645, 126 S.W.2d 262 (1939) where the court held that an
insured fire was not the proximate cause of the collision damage.
11. See, e.g., Shirey v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 274 P.2d 386 (Okla. 1954); Marks v.
Lumbermens Ins. Co., 160 Pa. Super. 66, 49 A.2d 855 (1946). Cf. Anderson v.
Connecticut Fire Ins. Co., 231 Minn. 469, 43 N.W.2d 807 (1950).
12. 197 Okla. 137, 168 P.2d 1016 (1946).
13. 265 Mich. 246, 251 N.W. 400 (1933).
14. The criticism of the Cole case is directed toward the reasons for the decision,
not the result. Since it is well established that an explosion caused by a fire is
within the terms of coverage of a fire policy, APPLEMAx, INsURANcE LAW AND PRAC-
TIcE § 3086 (1941); VAxcE, INsURNcE § 153 (3d ed. 1951), the insured was prob-
ably paying premiums on the basis that explosion loss caused by fire was covered and
recovery was warranted.
The insured could also argue that when the insurer excepted explosion damage
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cepted from policy coverage is to hold that the parties intended any
loss to be covered if proximately caused by an insured event. 5 Un-
like the contemplated damages test of contract law,'6 the court does
not inquire into what the parties actually intended, but only raises
an irrebuttable presumption that they intended the proximate cause
test to be applied. Courts using this approach are merely creating
a presumption in order to fill in the unexpressed terms of policy cov-
erage. This presumption would be valid only if the insured could
show that an ordinary property owner expects that an insurance
policy will cover all losses when proximately caused by an insured
event. On the other hand, if the insurer could show that premiums
were not calculated on the assumption that a proximate cause test
would be applied to determine policy coverage,' 7 or that a reason-
able and valid business purpose existed for excluding the loss, the
court would be less justified in presuming that the parties intended
the proximate cause test to be applied.
A third means of reconciling recovery with the policy terms is
for the court to say that the policy coverage is ambiguous when an
insured event causes an excepted loss, and to construe the ambiguity
most strongly against the insurer.'" For example, the New York
Standard Fire Policy provides: "this Company shall not be liable
for loss occurring . . . as a result of explosion or riot, unless fire
from the policy, it intended to exclude coverage of the more common types of
explosion such as boiler and other unintentional losses; it did not intend to exclude
an unusual loss such as that caused by the intentional act of an arsonist.
15. E.g., Lynn Gas & Elec. Co. v. Meriden Fire Ins. Co., 158 Mass. 570, 33 N.E.
690 (1893); Ortiz-Leon v. Porto Rican & Am. Ins. Co., 37 P.R.R. 303 (1927);
American Indem. Co. v. Haley, 25 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
16. See note 22 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the contemplated
damages test.
17. There is some evidence that the proximate cause test is the test used by insur-
ance companies to establish premiums. See Kochendorfer, Collision Damage Under
the Automobile Comprehensive Clause, 1951 INs. L.J. 171, 178 where the author, a
defense attorney for an insurance company, states:
To bring collision damage within the coverage of the comprehensive clause
of the automobile insurance policy, it is necessary that such damage be proxi-
mately caused by a hazard against which the automobile is insured under such
comprehensive clause. . . . the hazards insured against are not necessarily
limited to those specifically mentioned in the comprehensive clause.
Although the state has power to fix premiums charged by the insurer, German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914), most statutes provide only that
the insurance commissioner has the power to set aside the rates if it is determined,
by hearing, that they are excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory. E.g.,
Mmu. STAT. §§ 70.62-.64 (fire), 70.37-3.9 (casualty) (1957).
18. See, e.g., Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc'y v. Board of Comm'rs, 141 F.2d 600
(5th Cir. 1944); Edgerton & Sons, Inc. v. Minneapolis Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 142
Conn. 669, 116 A.2d 514 (1955); Boecker v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 281 S.W.2d
561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955); Pred v. Employers' Indem. Corp., 112 Neb. 161, 198
N.W. 864 (1924).
This general rule arises from the presumption that the insurer draws the contract
in his own favor. Miller v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 221, 289 N.W. 399
(1939).
ensue, and in that event for loss by fire only." 9 Without question,
the policy is completely ambiguous as to whether a loss is covered
when a fire causes an explosion. Where such ambiguities are present,
the court may apply the familiar rule of construction that ambigui-
ties in the policy are to be construed most strongly in favor of the
insured. Even though recovery would seem to be automatic when
this rule of construction is applied, this result is not unreasonable
because the insurer could have dispelled the ambiguity by clarifying
the policy terms as to whether these peripheral losses are covered.
It is evident that an application of the proximate cause test would
almost always result in recovery for the insured. The only defense
available to the insurer is to show that there is no proximate rela-
tionship between the insured event and the excepted loss. The util-
ity of this defense is questionable because rarely would there not be
a proximate relationship, and because of the seeming propensity of
jurors to find for the insured.0
Since an application of the proximate cause test seems to be
tantamount to recovery for the insured, the real question is whether
the result is sound. In some instances, the insurer may show that the
premiums of plaintiffs risk group were calculated on the basis that
only risks common to all were covered and that a loss was excepted
from policy coverage because not all members of plaintiff's risk
group were subjected to the risk of this loss. The insurer could then
prove that to allow recovery for such a loss would lead to increased
insurance premiums for the entire risk group, with the result that
some property owners would be paying for risks which do not con-
front them. For example, assume that A's building is heated by a
system involving a boiler while B's building is not. Even though the
risk of loss by explosion is greater for A than for B because of the
presence of the boiler, A and B could both be included in the same
risk group for fire insurance because loss by explosion is excepted.
But if the proximate cause test is applied and A is allowed to recover
for explosion damage because it is proximately caused by fire, an
insured event, the cost of insurance would probably be increased
for A and B's entire risk group. Thus B will pay for protection
against risk of loss by explosion even though such a risk does not
exist for him.
Proof that some insured property owners would be paying for
protection against a loss which does not exist for them indicates a
rational connection between the premium paid and the excepted
loss. Where such a relationship exists, there is a genuine business
19. N.Y. INs. LAw § 168(6).
20. See PATrmsoN, EssmNTLAms OF INsuRANCE LAW 7, 229 (2d ed. 1957) where
the author comments on the generosity of juries, and states that erroneous court
decisions are one of the insurers four major risks of loss.
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purpose in excepting the loss and courts should be less inclined to
grant recovery than if a valid business purpose did not exist.
B. The Contemplated Damages Test
Courts applying the contract theory of damages usually deny re-
covery when an insured event causes an excepted loss on the ground
that the terms of the policy and extrinsic evidence show clearly that
the parties did not intend the policy to cover this 1oss.21 The leading
case for application of the contemplated damages test is Bird v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.2" There the plaintiff's boat was damaged
by the concussion of an explosion caused by a fire on a distant shore.
In plaintiff's suit on his fire policy, the court denied recovery and
held that the fire was so distant from the insured's property that the
parties could not have contemplated such a loss to be covered. Chief
Judge Cardozo stated: "Our guide is the reasonable expectation and
purpose of an ordinary businessman when making an ordinary busi-
ness contract." 3 The rationale for applying the contract rule of
damages is also suggested in the Bird opinion: "There are times
when the law permits us to go far back in tracing events to causes.
The inquiry for us is how far the parties to his contract intended
us to go. The causes within their contemplation are the only causes
that concern us." 2
4
When a court applies the contemplated damages test, two funda-
mental considerations come into conflict. On the one hand, it is com-
mon knowledge that a typical insured does not read his insurance
policy 25 and therefore it is not necessarily true that, by an exception
clause, both parties intended a given loss to be excepted from policy
coverage. On the other hand, practical business considerations re-
quire that the insured be bound by the terms of the policy, regard-
21. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Bell, 151 Ga. 191, 106 S.E. 186 (1921); Hustace
v. Phenix Ins. Co., 175 N.Y. 292, 67 N.E. 592 (1903); Shahin v. Niagara Fire Ins.
Co., 265 App. Div. 397, 39 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1943); Service Trucking Co. v. American
Cas. Co., 160 Pa. Super. 331, 51 A.2d 397 (1947). Contra, Cook v. Continental Ins.
Co., 220 Ala. 162, 124 So. 239 (1928).
22. 224 N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86 (1918).
For applications of Chief Judge Cardozo's test in subsequent insurance cases, see,
e.g., Mork v. Eureka-Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 230 Minn. 382, 42 N.W.2d
33 (1950); Harris v. Allstate Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 72, 127 N.E.2d 816 (1955); Colley
v. Pearl Assur. Co., 184 Tenn. 11, 195 S.W.2d 15 (1946).
23. Bird. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 49, 120 N.E. 86, 87(1918).
24. Ibid.
25. In Keogh v. Sharon Township Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 195 Minn. 575, 578, 263
N.W. 601, 602 (1935), the court stated: "Policies of fire insurance are rarely exam-
ined by the insured. The same degree of vigilance and critical examination would not
be expected or demanded as in the case of some other instruments."
The New York courts have taken judicial notice of the fact that insured property
owners rarely read their insurance contracts. Magnolia-Broadway Corp. v. Fire Ass'n,
137 N.Y.S.2d 918 (1955). See VAN cE, INSURANCE § 44 (3d ed. 1951).
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less of the lack of an actual intent on the part of the insured.26 If
not, the insurer would have no effective means of controlling the risk
it assumes.
One means of reconciling these two conflicting considerations is to
look to whether the insurer can justify excluding the loss from cover-
age. If the insurer can produce no evidence supporting a valid busi-
ness purpose in excluding the loss from coverage, the court could
properly assume that the insurer included the exception clause only
for purposes of avoiding liability to the unwary policyholder. But if
the insurer demonstrates a valid business purpose in excluding the
loss, such as the availability of other insurance to cover the loss, or
that premiums were calculated and risk groups established on the
assumption that the loss was not covered, the court should be more
disposed to uphold the insurer's risk controls.
II. ExcErpr EvENT CAUSING AN INsuEm Loss
A property insurance policy frequently provides protection against
a general type of loss but excepts coverage for such a loss when
it is caused by a specific event.28 When a causal relationship exists
between the excepted event and the insured loss, 29 the policy
26. See VANcE, op. cit. supra note 25, at 259, where the author states:
a large and increasing number of courts apply to insurance contracts the strict
rule that he who puts his bargain in writing will not, in the absence of fraud
or mistake, be allowed to deny his knowledge of the terms of the writing or
question the binding force of any provisions thereof, whether in fact known
or unknown.
27. The Supreme Court of Washington has adopted what appears to be a third
test to determine policy coverage by stating:
In tort cases, the rules of proximate cause are applied for the single purpose of
fixing culpability, with which insurance cases are not concerned .... Insurance
cases are not concerned with why the injury occurred or the question of culpabil-
ity, but only with the nature of the injury and how it happened.
Bruener v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 37 Wash. 2d 181, 183, 222 P.2d 833, 835 (1950).
If the court intends to disregard the cause of the loss, this approach would work an
injustice on the insurer since the risk assumed is usually expressed in terms of insured
and excepted causes.
In Truck Ins. Exch. v. Rohde, 49 Wash. 2d 465, 303 P.2d 659 (1956) an automo-
bile driver had a liability policy covering up to $20,000 for each injury and up to
$50,000 for each accident. The question of whether the insurer was liable for $50,000
for one accident, or $150,000 for three accidents arose when the insured struck three
motorcycles riding tandem. The court held that the insurer was liable for only one
accident and not three, because the insured's single act of negligence was the proxi-
mate cause of all the damage. Although this case is distinguishable from Bruener as
one involving third-party liability, it may be an indication that the Washington
court has not completely abandoned the proximate cause test as a means of deter-
mining policy coverage.
28. See note 33 infra and accompanying text.
29. The term "insured loss" refers only to the general type of insurance held by
the policyholder when used in the context of an excepted event causing an insured
loss. Because the policy terms explicitly except it from coverage, it is not a loss
which the policyholder is protected against and to the extent that the term suggests
recovery, it is a misnomer.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:741
does not cover the loss. For example, in American Mfg. Corp. v. Na-
tional Union Fire Ins. Co." the plaintiff was covered by a policy in-
suring against damage caused by a sprinkler system but loss caused
by windstorm was excepted. The insured's property was damaged
when a windstorm blew off a section of roof causing a leak in the
sprinkler system. The court denied recovery 3' on the ground that
the "exception" clause excluded damage from sprinkler system leak-
age when caused by a windstorm. 2
In determining whether an insured loss caused by an excepted
event is covered, an application of the contemplated damages test
would be inappropriate when it requires an examination of extrinsic
evidence; the policy clearly states that the insurer does not assume
the risk of the loss. For example, the Minnesota Standard Fire Insur-
ance Policy provides:
This company shall not be liable for loss by fire or other perils insured
against in this policy caused, directly or indirectly by: (a) enemy attack
* (b) invasion; (c) insurrection; (d) rebellion; (e) revolution; (f)
civil war; (g) usurped power; (h) order of any civil authority. . . .3
Since the policy terms are clear and unambiguous as to whether a
loss is covered when caused by an excepted event, the court could
only find it to be the intention of the parties that the policy does not
cover the loss, and it would be improper for the court to look to
extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intentions. 34
Although the terms of the policy are explicit, courts have demon-
30. 203 La. 507, 14 So. 2d 430 (1942).
31. In denying recovery, the court overruled Hardin Bag & Burlap Co. v. Fidelity
& Guar. Fire Corp., 1 So. 2d 830 (La. 1941), revd, 203 La. 778, 14 So. 2d 634
(1943). In the latter case, the court held that the exception clause did not qualify
the original coverage of the policy, and referred only to hazards unrelated to the
insured event.
32. In Washington, where the court has rejected the proximate cause rule and
adopted a test allowng recovery if the loss itself is insured, Bruener v. Twin City
Fire Insur. Co., 37 Wash. 2d 181, 222 P.2d 833 (1950), recovery may be allowed
because the loss itself was insured against. See note 27 supra; 64 HIav. L. REv.
859 (1951).
33. Mni. STAT. § 65.011(2) (1957).
The New York Standard Fire Policy provides:
This Company shall not be liable for loss by fire or other perils insured against
in this policy, caused, directly or indirectly, by insurrection, invasion, bombard-
ment, rebellion, revolution, or military or usurped power; nor by order of any
civil authority.
N.Y. INs. LAw § 168(6). (Emphasis added.) See PA-rERsoN, CAsEs oN INsURANCE
390-91 (3d ed. 1955).
34. In Port Washington Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 253
App. Div. 760, 300 N.Y. Supp. 874 (1937), the insured's building was accidently
destroyed by fire when federal agents demolished a distillery contained in the build-
ing. The fire policy excepted "loss or damage caused directly or indirectly...
by order of any civil authority." A New York court, in a jurisdiction which usually
applied Chief Judge Cardozo's contemplated damages test as set out in the Bird case,
denied recovery on the ground that the fire was proximately caused by an excepted
event.
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strated a reluctance to deny recovery even though a causal relation-
ship appeared to exist. A variety of devices have been used to arrive
at a result which would permit recovery. One device is to find an
efficient and intervening cause breaking the chain of causation be-
tween the excepted event and the insured loss. For example, in Max-
well v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co.35 the plaintiff was insured
against sprinkler system damage but loss caused by windstorm was
excepted. Insured's goods were damaged when a windstorm tore a
hole in the roof of his building and caused the sprinkler system to
leak. The court granted recovery on the ground that the wind was
an indirect and remote cause of the loss because the hazard of the
sprinkler system intervened.
It would appear that the sprinkler system damage caused by the
windstorm was precisely the type of damage which the insurer in-
tended to exclude from policy coverage.36 Of course, where there is
what can be fairly termed an intervening cause, the court is justified
in granting recovery.37 But under the court's analysis in the Maxwell
case every insured hazard could be construed as an intervening
force breaking the chain of causation, and the insurer's risk controls
would be subverted.
Another device used to permit recovery is to treat the excepted
event and the insured loss as two independent risks and to disregard
the causal connection between them. This approach is suggested by
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Newman's Inc.35 There, the policy insured
against sprinkler damage but "excepted, among other things, loss or
damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . cyclone."39 A cyclone
caused the sprinkler system to go off, but the court granted recovery
on the ground that the policy did not exclude damage from the
sprinkler system when caused by extraneous forces. The court's ra-
tionale seemed to be that because the excepted event and the insured
loss were independent risks, the causal relationship between the two
35. 73 Ind. App. 251, 125 N.E. 645 (1920).
36. The policy language provided in part:
This company shall not be liable (1) for loss by fire, however caused; (2) nor
for loss resulting from the leakage of water, if such leakage is caused directly
or indirectly by fire; (3) nor for loss due to stoppage or interruption of any
work or plant, unless liability for such loss is specifically assumed herein; (4)
nor for loss caused by lightning (whether fire ensued or not), cyclone, tornado,
windstorm, earthquake, explosion, or blasting....
Id. at 254, 125 N.E. at 646. (Emphasis added.)
37. For example, in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Razook, 24 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1928)
the policy covered loss from rain damage but excepted loss caused directly or in-
directly by windstorm. When the insured sued for damage from rain driven through
windows broken by a windstorm, the court granted recovery on the ground that
the rain was an intervening force between the breaking of the windows by the wind
and the ultimate damage from rain. The court's result is sound, for there was no com-
pelling causal relationship between the force of the wind and the rain damage.
38. 108 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1939).
39. Id. at 562.
1960] NOTES
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
was immaterial. Under the policy language the court was unjustified
in granting recovery because the only reasonable interpretation of
the policy was that it excepted from coverage all damage caused by
a windstorm.4" Here again the court disregarded the explicit terms
of the policy by granting recovery.
When the insurer excepts losses of the general type insured against
when caused by a specific event, the court should only look to
whether a causal relationship exists between the cause of the loss
and the loss itself. If such a causal relationship does exists, the court
should deny recovery even though the insured believed he was pro-
tected unless some equitable grounds exist for reformation of the
policy.41 The common belief of the property owner as to the protec-
tion he receives under the insurance policy should be irrelevant
when the policy terms are so explicit.
III. CONCURRENT CAUSES
A. Proximate Cause Test
Another perplexing problem in determining policy coverage arises
when two causes, one insured and one uninsured or specifically
excepted,42 join to produce a loss which neither would have pro-
duced alone.4" Most courts apply the proximate cause test and allow
the jury to determine which force was the predominant and efficient
cause of the loss. 44 For example, in Anderson v. Connecticut Fire
Ins. Co.45 the insured building collapsed from the combined forces
of wind and an accumulation of snow on the roof. Plaintiff recovered
40. If the insurer did not intend to exclude sprinkler system damage caused by
windstorm, it must have intended to exclude direct windstorm damage without the
intervening agency of the sprinkler system. But the latter interpretation is ludicrous
because it is so obvious that an insurance policy protecting against damage caused
by a sprinkler system would not cover windstorm damage that it would be unneces-
sary to even mention such an exclusion.
41. See, e.g., Mosiman v. Rapacz, 250 Minn. 464, 84 N.W.2d 898 (1957).
42. Since a specifically excepted cause of loss is as much at the risk of the insured
as is an uninsured cause of loss, there should be no distinction between an insured
cause joining with an uninsured cause and an insured cause joining with a speci-
fically excepted cause.
43. The natural incidents of a force already in motion are not regarded as con-
current with the moving force. RIcARDs, INSURANCE § 448 (4th ed. 1932). If the
damages are severable, the loss is attributed to each and recovery is allowed only
for the insured loss. Howard Fire Ins. Co. v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 90 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 194 (1870).
44. See, e.g., Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Muhle, 208 F.2d 191 (8th Cir. 1953);
Princess Garment Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 115 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1940);
Phenix Ins. Co. v. Charleston Bridge Co., 65 Fed. 628 (4th Cir. 1895); Clouse v.
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 152 Neb. 230, 40 N.W.2d 820 (1950); Wood v.
Michigan Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 245 N.C. 383, 96 S.E.2d 28 (1957); Finney
v. Sandy & Beaver Valley Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 105 Ohio App. 441, 152 N.E.2d
689 (1957).
45. 231 Minn. 469, 43 N.W.2d 807 (1950).
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on a windstorm policy which excepted damage caused by snow; the
appellate court, in affirming stated:
it was for the jury to determine whether a windstorm was the efficient
and proximate cause of the damage to the building within the coverage
of the policy, or whether a blizzard or snowstorm was the efficient and
proximate cause thereof within the meaning of the exclusionary clause.46
In a case such as this, where the damages caused by each force are
inseparable, the burden of the total loss falls on the party who
assumed the risk of the cause of the loss which the jury finds to be
proximate.47
When a loss has been occasioned by concurrent causes, it is anom-
alous to apply the proximate cause test and permit the jury to deter-
mine that one was the predominant and efficient cause of the loss.
Clearly, the loss would not have occurred but for the combination
of two independent forces, the uniting of which is the real precipi-
tating cause of the loss. 48 Since the risk of loss caused by one force
is borne by the insurer and the risk of loss of the other force is borne
by the insured, to grant or deny recovery for the total loss assumes
that one party intended to bear both risks. Even though the damages
are inseparable, it would be fairer to simply divide the loss evenly
than to require one party to bear the total burden. This principle
has often been applied to joint tortfeasors 49 and to contribution
among two or more insurers who have each insured the damaged
property under separate policies.50
B. Contemplated Damages Test
A few courts have applied the contemplated damages test to
concurrent cause cases and have inquired into what the parties must
have reasonably intended at the time of policy execution.51 In Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. Nelson52 plaintiff sued on a policy insuring
against windstorm damage but excepting damage from hail. The
46. Id. at 476-77, 43 N.W.2d at 813.
47. Id. at 475-76, 43 N.W.2d at 812.
48. For example, if a property owner had protection against rain damage, but
damages caused by windstorm was excepted, and the wind drove the rain through
an open, vertical window, the damage would be a result of the uniting of the two
forces. Oviously, no damage would have occurred from the action of one force alone.
49. PRossm,, ToRTs § 46, at 248 (2d ed. 1955).
50. VANCE, INsuRANcE § 14 (3d ed. 1951).
The New York Standard Fire Policy states:
This company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss than the
amount hereby insured shall bear to the whole insurance covering the property
against the peril involved, whether collectible or not.
N.Y. INs. LAw § 168. In policies containing this pro rata insurance clause, the
insurer's liability for contribution is limited to the proportion of its policy to the
total insurance on the property.
51. See e.g., Palatine Ins. Co. v. Petrovich, 285 S.W. 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
52. 64 Kan. 115, 67 Pac. 440 (1902).
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court denied recovery when wind-driven hail damaged the insured's
building. The court reasoned that since hail insurance was available
at a higher premium, the insurer did not intend to assume the
greater risk of hail damage at this lower premium rate. The existence
of other insurance may be strong evidence of what the insurer in-
tended the policy to cover. However, unless it can be shown that the
insured also knew or should have known 53 of other available insur-
ance, this factor would not be competent evidence of what both
parties intended. The burden of showing that the insured had
knowledge of the availability of other insurance should rest on the
insurer.
Even if the insurer demonstrates that the insured knew or should
have known of the availability of other insurance, this fact alone
should not be conclusive of the parties' intent. It does not necessarily
follow that because the insured knew of the availability of other
insurance, he also knew that his policy excepted events for which
coverage was available under other types of insurance and that he
intended a loss occasioned by concurrent causes to be either totally
included or totally excluded from policy coverage.
Another factor which the courts use to determine the intention
of the parties is the physical setting of the insured property. For
example, in National Fire Ins. Co. v. Crutchfield 54 the insured prop-
erty, situated in a traditional flood area, was destroyed by a com-
bination of high wind and flood water. The court denied recovery
on the ground that the policy excepted flood damage, and said it
was immaterial which force was the proximate cause of the loss
because from the physical setting of the property, it was clear that
the parties intended to exclude recovery when damage was even
indirectly caused by flood. But where the physical setting of the
property is not unique and gives no indication of what the parties
intended, the probative value of looking to the physical setting is
lost. Since the location of most insured property would probably not
indicate what the parties intended as to particular losses, the utility
of looking to the physical setting is limited.
In general, an application of the contemplated damages test would
seem inappropriate in concurrent cause cases. In most situations the
parties probably had no actual intent as to who would bear the loss;
therefore it would be improper to require one party to bear the total
loss. Dividing the loss between the insured and the insurer would
be more equitable when the intent of the parties is so speculative.55
58. Knowledge of the availability of other insurance could be assumed when the
common understanding of insurance purchasers is that a different and independent
risk is involved and would naturally be covered by other insurance.
54. 160 Ky. 802, 170 S.W. 187 (1914).
55. See notes 49 & 50 supra and accompanying text.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Neither the proximate cause test nor the contemplated damages
test is sufficient to accurately determine policy coverage. The proxi-
mate cause test is subject to the criticism that it permits recovery
which may extend beyond the terms of the policy. An application
of the contemplated damages test to determine the parties' intent
when the parties' actual intent is not manifested may be so con-
jectural as to be virtually useless.
Often the courts do not base their decisions upon a logical appli-
cation of these tests, but rather appear to use them to justify a result
based on other reasons. Inconsistent approaches to the question of
policy coverage have magnified the uncertainty in this area, and an
elementary step for the court is to at least be consistent in applying
a particular test. A test is needed which can be applied to a given
fact situation so that the results can be more accurately predicted.
Ideally, the parties' intent should be clearly spelled out in the terms
of the policy. But, of course, the parties could not possibly consider
all contingencies, and there would always be areas not specifically
covered by the policy.
Perhaps the proximate cause test is the more appropriate test to
apply where an excepted event causes an insured loss, or where an
insured event causes an excepted loss. Even though the court's
result may appear to be contrary to the terms of the policy, if the
court commits itself in advance to such a test, it will be the common
understanding of the insurance purchaser that the policy will either
exclude or include these peripheral losses; premiums can then be
calculated accordingly. If the premiums are so calculated, the par-
ties' intent will coincide with the court's result. More predictability
is achieved because any layman can reasonably determine whether
a "proximate" relationship exists between a given event and a loss.
Certainly, the results are more predictable under the proximate
cause test than under the contemplated damages test where the
court is free to make any arbitrary determination as to what the
parties reasonably intended.
There are several advantages to selecting a test which gives some
predictability of result. The cost of insurance will be reduced be-
cause the number of cases requiring litigation by the insurer will be
diminished; the insured will not litigate a case in which it appears
that he will not recover, nor will the insurer defend a case where it
appears that the insured will recover. Claims will be paid more
promptly with less costly and time-consuming litigation for the
insured. The chances that the insured or the insurer will get a wind-
fall will be reduced if the courts are consistent in applying the proxi-
mate cause test because the parties can more accurately establish the
premiums in accordance with the risks involved.
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